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ABSTRACT 
 
Concern about the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ is misplaced. Judged against prevailing standards in existing advanced 
industrial democracies, rather than those of an ideal plebiscitary or parliamentary democracy, the EU is 
democratically legitimate. Its institutions are tightly constrained by constitutional checks and balances: narrow 
mandates, fiscal limits, super-majoritarian and concurrent voting requirements and separation of powers. There is 
little evidence that the EU impacts an unjustifiable neo-liberal bias on EU policy. The apparently disproportionate 
insulation of EU institutions reflects the subset of functions they perform – central banking, constitutional 
adjudication, civil prosecution, economic diplomacy and technical administration – which are matters of low 
electoral salience commonly delegated in national systems, for normatively justifiable reasons. Efforts to expand 
participation in the EU, even if successful, are thus unlikely to greatly expand meaningful deliberation. On balance, 
the EU redresses rather than creates biases in political representation, deliberation and output.  
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Is the European Union democratically legitimate?
1 It is an appropriate moment to pose 
this question. The last decade has witnessed the emergence of a stable institutional equilibrium—
let us term it the “European Constitutional Settlement”—that serves as a de facto constitution for 
Europe. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice failed to alter its structure significantly. Delibera-
tions now underway, despite being turbo-charged with constitutional rhetoric, are unlikely to 
achieve much more. The most ambitious proposals still under serious discussion—incremental 
expansion of qualified majority voting or flexibility, the creation of a forum for national parlia-
mentarians, restructuring the European Council and its presidency, for example—consolidate 
decade-long trends rather than launching new ones. Incremental moves to deepen foreign policy, 
justice, and monetary policy cooperation appear to require only minor centralizing reform, and 
few other functional issues of significance are visible on the horizon. None of this will alter the 
essential trajectory of European integration. We may now be glimpsing the constitutional order 
that will govern Europe, barring a severe crisis, for the foreseeable future. 
 
The question of legitimacy is timely also because the last decade has witnessed nearly 
continuous debate over the proper constitutional structure for Europe. In a much lauded book, 
Oxford don Larry Siedentop asks, “Where are the Madisons for Europe?” (Siedentop 2000). Yet 
the more appropriate question for those who have followed European thinking is: “Why are there 
so many Madisons?” (Moravcsik 2001). Hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of scholars, com-
mentators, lawyers, and politicians have analyzed this problem. Every conceivable proposal has 
been canvassed, ranging from the construction of a centralized European social welfare state to a 
federal commitment to English, Christianity, and juridical localism. Advocates and opponents of 
each have mustered myriad constitutional theories, social scientific hypotheses, everyday politi-
cal anecdotes, and good old-fashioned political rhetoric. Never before in history have such rich 
and varied intellectual resources been brought to bear on an international political process—a 
discourse from which we can learn much.  
 
Both political negotiations and intellectual debates have focused, perhaps above all, on 
the question of whether the EU is democratically legitimate. Most politicians, scholarly commen-
tators and members of the European public appear to agree that the EU suffers from a severe 
“democratic deficit.” There are many reasons why this perception is so widespread. An organi-
zation of continental scope will of course appear rather distant from the individual European citi-
zen. As a multi-national body, moreover, it lacks the grounding in a common history, culture, 
discourse and symbolism on which most individual polities can draw. (Only a few traditionally 
federalist countries offer symbolic resources for overcoming the gulf.) Neither of these, however, 
need necessarily disqualify the EU from being treated as a democratically legitimate body. 
Rather, when analysts criticize the lack of democratic legitimacy of the EU, they generally point 
to the mode of political representation and the nature of policy outputs.  
 
The basic case for the existence of a “democratic deficit” is straightforward. Only one 
branch of the EU is directly elected: the European Parliament (EP). Though stronger than it once 
was, the EP remains only one of three major actors in the EU legislative process. Its elections are 
decentralized, apathetic affairs, in which a relatively small number of voters select among na-
tional parties on the basis of national issues. Little discussion of European issues, let alone an 
                                                 
1 I gratefully acknowledge conversations, comments and assistance from Phillip Budden, Oliver Gerstenberg, Simon Hix, Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Helen Wallace, Joseph Weiler, an anonymous reviewer, and participants in the fortieth anniversary conference 
of the Journal of Common Market Studies, as well as able research assistance from Mark Copelovitch.   
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ideal transnational deliberation, takes place. For its part, the European Commission, which en-
joys a powerful role as an agenda-setter and regulatory coordinator, is widely perceived as a 
technocracy. The European Court of Justice, comprised of fifteen appointed judges, is unusually 
powerful. Most powerful of all, the Council of Ministers brings together national ministers, dip-
lomatic representatives, and administrative officials from the member states, who often deliber-
ate in secret. While indirectly accountable to voters, the link is too tenuous and the mode of 
interaction too diplomatic or technocratic to satisfy many observers. 
 
These procedural qualms might be tolerable were it not for the perceived bias in the out-
puts of European policy-making. Many view the EU as a throw-back to the nineteenth century—
a fiscally weak, neo-liberal state. EU directives and regulations promote wider and deeper mar-
kets, while providing only a truncated range of compensating and counterbalancing policies of 
regulatory protection or social welfare guarantees. If—as Karl Polanyi and Joseph Schumpeter 
asserted—the legitimacy of democratic capitalism rests on an explicit compromise between mar-
kets and social protection, then the EU appears a dangerous exception (Polanyi 1944). The most 
salient task of the modern state is to equalize life chances and socialize the risk faced by in-
dividual citizens, a goal to which the EU appears indifferent or even hostile. No wonder, then, 
that many Europeans—and disproportionately the poor, female, economically peripheral, and re-
cipients of public sector support—view the EU with skepticism. 
 
For these reasons, many believe it is self-evident that the EU is not democratically legiti-
mate. Yet my central contention here is that if we adopt reasonable criteria for judging demo-
cratic governance, the widespread criticism of the EU as democratically illegitimate is unsup-
ported by the existing empirical evidence—much of it provided by critics of the “democratic 
deficit.” At the very least, their critique must be heavily qualified. Constitutional checks and 
balances, indirect democratic control via national governments, and the increasing powers of 
the European Parliament are sufficient to assure that the EU policy-making is, in nearly all 
cases, clean, transparent, effective, and politically responsive to the demands of European 
citizens.  
 
Most critics overlook the relatively optimistic conclusion to be drawn from the evidence 
because they analyze the EU in ideal and isolated terms. Comparisons are posed between the EU 
and an ideal ancient, Westminster-style, or frankly utopian form of deliberative democracy. 
While perhaps useful for philosophical purposes, the use of idealistic standards no modern gov-
ernment can meet obscures the social context of contemporary European policy making—the 
real-world practices of existing governments and the multi-level political system in which they 
act. This leads many analysts to overlook the extent to which delegation to insulated non-
majoritarian, bodies such as constitutional courts, central banks, regulatory agencies, criminal 
prosecutors, and insulated executive negotiators is a widespread trend in modern democracies, 
which must be acknowledged on its own terms. Moreover, it is a tendency with a great deal of 
normative and pragmatic justification. In this regard, moreover, most analysts view the EU in 
isolation, and thus fail to fully appreciate the symbiotic relationship between national and EU 
policy-making—a division of labor in which commonly delegated functions tend to be carried 
out by the EU, while those functions that inspire and induce popular participation remain largely 
national. This gives observers the impression that the EU is undemocratic, whereas it is in fact 
simply specializing in those aspects of modern democratic governance that tend to involve less 
direct political participation. We might of course nonetheless choose to criticize the broader  
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trend toward professional administration, judicial enforcement of rights, and strong executive 
leadership, but it is unrealistic to expect the EU to bear the brunt of such a critique—a point to 
which I return in the conclusion.  
 
I proceed as follows. In successive sections, I analyze the constraints inherent in the 
European Constitutional Settlement that guarantee that the EU will not become a despotic 
“superstate,” the democratic procedures that prevent the EU from becoming an arbitrary and un-
accountable technocracy within its domain, the legitimate reasons for shielding certain EU 
decision makers from direct democratic contestation, the underlying social reasons why political 
participation in the EU cannot be radically expanded, the extent to which EU policy-making suf-
fers from an excessive neo-liberal bias. Final sections consider whether these assessments are 
likely to change with the enlargement of the EU, and how the analyze might be generalized. 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS: WHY THE EU IS NOT A “SUPERSTATE” 
 
The classic justification for democracy is to check and channel the arbitrary and poten-
tially corrupt power of the state. Accordingly, arbitrary rule by national and supranational tech-
nocrats—“bureaucratic despotism” by a “super-state” in Brussels, as one formulation has it—is a 
widespread concern in regard to contemporary EU politics (Siedentop 2000, cf. Moravcsik 
2001). This is the stuff of British tabloid articles, often fueled by ignorance of what the EU ac-
tually does, but it underlies much legitimate concern, particular by those on the libertarian right 
of the political spectrum. This concern appears to gain plausibility from the overtly technocratic 
nature of much EU regulation, the open role played by non-elected officials in Brussels, and the 
geographical and cultural distance between those regulators and the average European “person in 
the street.” 
 
Yet the threat of a European superstate is a myth. The European Constitutional Settle-
ment imposes tight constraints on EU policy. Indeed, it combines and exceeds the most extreme 
constraints imposed by consociational or consensus democracy (beyond, say, the Netherlands or 
Austria of years past), federalism (e.g. Switzerland or Canada), separation of powers (e.g. the 
United States), and reduced fiscal competences (e.g. the United States or Switzerland). The result 
is as much confederal as federal (Moravcsik 2000, Elazar 2002), and nearly eliminates any threat 
of a European superstate. A set of substantive, fiscal, administrative, legal, and procedural con-
straints on EU policy-making are embedded in treaty and legislative provisions that have the 
force of constitutional law—to which we now turn. 
 
Substantive Constraints and the Focus on Cross-Border Economic Activity  
 
The EU’s current activities are restricted by treaty and practice to a modest subset of the 
substantive activities pursued by modern states. Its substantive mandate focuses primarily on the 
regulation of policy externalities directly resulting from cross-border economic activity. The core 
of EU activity and its strongest constitutional prerogatives still lie almost exclusively in the area 
of trade in goods and services, the movement of factors of production, the production of and 
trade in agricultural commodities, exchange rates and monetary policy, foreign aid, and trade-
related environmental, consumer, and competition policy. To be sure, there are exceptions, in-
cluding a modest level of regional and structural funding of infrastructure exists, primarily as a 
side payment for the creation of core policies, in some areas regulatory controls exceed narrow  
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market-making functions, and immigration and foreign policies are emergent areas of action. But 
these tend often to be treated in more intergovernmental procedures, whereas the strongest con-
stitutional prerogatives of the EU remain primarily economic. 
 
Much is thereby excluded from the EU policy agenda. Absent concerns include taxation 
and the setting of fiscal priorities, social welfare provision, defense and police powers, education 
policy, cultural policy, non-economic civil litigation, direct cultural promotion and regulation, 
the funding of civilian infrastructure, and most other regulatory policies unrelated to cross-border 
economic activity. To be sure, the EU has made modest inroads into many of these areas, but 
largely in limited areas directly related to cross-border flows.
2 Even within the core functions of 
the EU, governments are allowed to exempt themselves to maintain high regulatory protection 
(e.g. environmental and social policy) or to act unilaterally where the EU has not effectively 
legislated (e.g. air transport). 
 
Fiscal Constraints and the Emergence of a “Regulatory Polity” 
 
One might object at this point that this analysis treats the status quo as a “snapshot” and 
thereby overlooks the future trajectory of integration. Yet the EU’s institutional capacity to act in 
new areas and new ways is constrained by a severe lack of fiscal, administrative, and legal 
authority, thereby partially mitigating the imperative to maintain close and constant legislative 
scrutiny. To a first approximation, the EU does not tax, spend, implement, or coerce, and in 
many areas, it does not hold a legal monopoly of public authority.  
 
It is not coincidental that the policies absent from the EU’s policy portfolio—notably 
social welfare provision, defense, education, culture, and infrastructure—require high govern-
ment expenditure. The ability to tax and spend is what most strikingly distinguishes the modern 
European state from its predecessors, yet the EU’s ability to tax is capped at about 2-3 percent of 
national and local government spending (1.3 percent of GDP) and is unlikely to change soon. 
The spending of these funds, moreover, are explicitly dedicated to a small range of policies—the 
common agricultural policy, structural funding, and development aid—that must periodically be 
renewed by unanimous consent of the member states. The EU is thereby rendered a “regulatory 
polity”—a polity with legal instruments but little fiscal capacity. (Majone 1996, 1998) 
 
These fiscal constraints have important consequences. They leave little room for discre-
tionary funding by Brussels technocrats. Important funding priorities in agriculture and structural 
funding are set by strict unanimous intergovernmental agreement. Moreover, even in areas of the 
EU’s greatest fiscal activity, such as agriculture and infrastructure, much (generally most) public 
funding remains national. There is considerable evidence from the two largest areas of EU 
spending, the Common Agricultural Policy and Structural Funds, that national governments 
possess the resources to counteract broad fiscal priorities set by authorities in Brussels. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The scholarly literature on European integration seems to pay disproportionate attention to exceptional cases of “spillover” in 
cases such as gender discrimination, the initial experience with environmental policy and structural funding, the jurisprudence of 
supremacy and direct effect, the Commission’s use of Article 90, and the possible, but as yet undocumented, effects of the Open 
Method of Coordination. These are important trends, but atypical of the EU as a whole.  
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Administrative Constraints and the Decentralized Politics of Implementation 
 
Analysts often observe that the essential politics of regulation lays in implementation, yet 
the EU implements very few of its own regulations. With the exception of monetary policy, com-
petition policy, and the conduct of, though not the ultimate control over, external trade nego-
tiations, the powers of the EU to administer and implement are, in fact, exceptionally weak. How 
could it be otherwise, given the extraordinarily small size of the Brussels bureaucracy? The EU 
employs fewer people than a modest European city. They total about 1/40
th the number of com-
parable civilian federal employees even in the United States, a jurisdiction of comparable size 
but noted in cross-national perspective for the small size of its national government workforce. 
Except in a few areas the task of legally or administratively implementing EU regulations falls 
instead to national parliaments and administrations.  
 
Were this not enough, the EU has no police, military force, or significant investigatory 
capacity—and no realistic prospect of obtaining any of these. Take the military. Even if the most 
ambitious plans currently on the table in European defense were fully realized, the EU would 
control only 2 percent of European NATO forces—and these forces could be employed only for a 
narrow range of regional peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks. Similarly, whereas the EU is co-
ordinating efforts to combat international crime, the decentralized structure of national police, 
criminal justice, and punishment systems, while externally constrained, remains in essence large-
ly unchanged. 
 
Procedural Constraints and the Politics of Checks and Balances 
 
Of course the lack of administrative clout, and even perhaps of fiscal discretion, would be 
of less consequence if the EU technocracy could act unhampered by procedural constraints. The 
EU’s ability to act, even in those areas where it enjoys clear competence, is constrained by in-
stitutional checks and balances, notably the separation of powers, a multi-level structure of 
decision-making, and a plural executive. This makes arbitrary action—and, indeed, any action—
difficult and tends to empower veto groups that can capture a subset of national governments. 
Such institutional procedures are the conventional tool for protecting the interests of vital minori-
ties—a design feature generally thought to be most appropriate to polities, like the EU, designed 
to accommodate heterogeneous cultural and substantive interests. (Lijphart 1990) 
 
The most fundamental constraint lies in the requirement of unanimity for amendment of 
the Treaty of Rome, followed by electoral, parliamentary, or administrative ratification—a high 
standard for any fundamental act of substantive redirection or institutional delegation. Accord-
ingly, the EU has developed over the past two decades only by focusing on core areas of excep-
tionally broad consensus, backed by large financial side-payments to persuade recalcitrant mem-
ber states. Whereas judicial decisions like the celebrated Cassis de Dijon case, which ushered in 
the single market, may have helped set the agenda for initiatives like the single market, monetary 
union or enlargement, there is now agreement in the scholarly literature that they could not do so 
without nearly consensual support from the member states (Alter 2002). Even “everyday” EU 
directives must be promulgated under rules that require the concurrent support of between 74 and 
100 percent of the weighted votes of territorial representatives in the Council of Ministers—a 
level of support higher than required for legislation in any existing national polity or, indeed, to 
amend nearly any national constitution in the world today.  
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Surmounting supermajoritarian and unanimous voting requirements is not enough, how-
ever, to pass legislation. The EU is not a system of parliamentary sovereignty but one of separa-
tion of powers. Power is divided horizontally among the Commission, Council, Parliament, and 
Court, and vertically among local, national, and transnational levels—requiring concurrent ma-
jorities for action. For legislation, the Commission must propose; the Parliament must consent; if 
the challenged, the Court must approve; national parliaments or officials must transpose into 
national law; and national bureaucracies must implement. Indeed, even within each branch and 
level of EU governance, we encounter extraordinary pluralism. The Commission itself is a plural 
executive—so much so that experts disagree whether it is an executive at all. The EP requires 
unusually high majorities to act. As a result, consistent and effective EU policy-making tends to 
be possible only where there exists not just a supermajority of national representatives but a 
supermajority of European technocrats, judges and parliamentarians as well. Current proposals to 
represent more groups, for example through another chamber representing national parliamen-
tarians, can only exacerbate this tendency.  
 
Legal Constraints and the Politics of Competences 
 
If, after such widespread consent, legislation is nonetheless unacceptable to EU member 
states, they have real alternatives to strict reliance on EU norms. This is so to a far greater extent 
than even the most decentralized of national federations. In core areas of trade and factor flows, 
to be sure, EU rules remain relatively strict and are enforced as such. Yet there are also a number 
of areas, even in matters of economic policy, in which governments can act “minilaterally”—
inside or outside of the EU. These include issues in which a subset of EU governments can work 
through other international organizations (e.g. human rights, defense, border controls and some 
environmental policy, the UN Security Council), and areas where a ‘core’ of governments can 
move ahead collectively inside the institutions (e.g. “flexibility,” “enhanced cooperation” or “co-
alitions of the willing” in social, monetary, defense, and immigration policies, as well as long 
transition periods for new members in agriculture). In other areas, such as environmental policy, 
governments may opt out of EU regulations to provide higher regulatory protection. The number 
of such mechanisms has increased over the past decade, and their important role distinguishes 
the EU from national federations.
3 
 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL: WHY THE EU IS NOT AN UNACCOUNTABLE TECHNOCRACY 
 
We have just seen that the EU is more constrained than any national polity, in part 
through its own plural structure of checks and balances, and in part through its need to coexist 
within a multi-level system of governance with fiscally, administratively and legally more 
powerful nation-states. This renders the specter of a “European superstate” absurd. Hence most 
analysts prefer to speak of a more diffuse “governance system.” 
 
Still, no matter how constrained its substantive and institutional scope, there remain sub-
stantial areas—notably important matters of market regulation, monetary policy and other related 
regulation—in which the EU legislation and regulation is dominant. In these areas, policy-
making remains rather centralized in Brussels, albeit with constant member state and interest 
                                                 
3 There are, of course, isolated examples in other jurisdictions, such as the proliferation of “interstate compacts” among states of 
the United States.  
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group input. In the cases of ECJ jurisprudence, ECB setting of monetary policy and the Commis-
sion’s handling of competition policy, for example, these powers are handled by semi-
autonomous supranational authorities. Even where legislation and regulation remains subject, as 
it is generally, to supermajoritarian consent, it might be objected that the EU policy process fa-
vors national bureaucrats and ministers at the expense of national parliaments and publics. The 
EU, from this perspective, is an insulated cartel of supranational and national technocrats. 
 
As a description of EU policy-making, there may be truth to this (Moravcsik 1994). But what is 
the implication for democratic legitimacy? I argue in this section that the insulation of the EU 
from mechanisms to assure democratic accountability is easily exaggerated, particularly by those 
who tend to overlook the multi-level constraints embedded in the European Constitutional Settle-
ment arising from democratic control over national governments. Moreover, where the EU dele-
gates to a constitutional court, central bank or other semi-autonomous authorities, its structure is 
consistent with the late twentieth-century practice of most advanced industrial democracies. 
Even if we were to reject outright the modern trend toward delegated policy-making, it would 
surely be normatively arbitrary as well as politically futile to expect the EU to bear the brunt of 
such opposition.  
 
Direct and Indirect Democratic Accountability 
 
Given the vehemence of the critique leveled against it, one might assume the EU lacks 
any form of democratic participation and accountability. Yet in fact the EU employs two such 
mechanisms: direct accountability via the EP and indirect accountability via elected national of-
ficials.  
 
For over a decade, the EP has been progressively usurping the role of the Commission as 
the primary agenda-setter vis-à-vis the Council in the EU legislative process. It is now the EP 
that, late in the legislative process, accepts, rejects or amends legislation in a manner more 
difficult for the Council to reject than to accept—a prerogative traditionally accorded the Com-
mission. The EP is directly elected, generally by proportional representation within nation-states, 
and often acts independently of ruling national parties. Whereas one might criticize the absence 
of clear programmatic elections, the EP nonetheless has an effective system of party cooperation, 
with votes most often splitting along party lines and in which recognizable ideological cleavages 
shape voting patterns. Among the most relevant difference between the European Parliament and 
national parliaments appears to be the tendency of the EP to reach decisions by large majorities. 
Yet this tendency underscores the tendency of the EU to reach decisions by consensus—unsur-
prising given the high level of support required in the Council of Ministers—and should give us 
reason for confidence that it is legislating in the “European” interest (Hix et al 2002).  
 
Still, if European elections were the only form of democratic accountability to which the 
EU were subject, skepticism would surely be warranted. Yet a more important channel lies in the 
democratically elected governments of the member states, which dominate the still largely terri-
torial and intergovernmental structure of the EU. In the European Council, which is consoli-
dating its position as the EU’s dominant institution, elected heads of state and government wield 
power directly (Ludlow 2002). In the Council of Ministers, which imposes the most important 
binding constraint on everyday EU legislation, permanent representatives, ministerial officials 
and the ministers themselves from each country act under constant instruction from national 
executives, just as they would at home. Here the bonds of accountability are tight: these repre- 
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sentatives can be recalled or re-instructed at will, often more easily than parliamentarians in na-
tional systems. In addition, national parliaments consider and comment on many EU policies, 
though their de facto ability to influence policy fluctuates greatly by country.  
 
Broad representation also encourages transparent policy-making. In contrast to the wide-
spread impression of a cadre of secretive gnomes of Brussels, supranational officials in fact work 
under intense public scrutiny. The legislative process works slowly, without any equivalent to 
ruling by executive decree or pushing legislation swiftly through a friendly parliament, and infor-
mation appears as plentiful about the EU political and regulatory process, at least at the Brussels 
level, than about similar processes in nearly all of its member states. With twenty commissioners 
and their staffs, fifteen national delegations, over 600 parliamentarians, hundreds of national 
ministers and thousands of national officials, ex ante parliamentary scrutiny in some countries 
and ex post parliamentary scrutiny in nearly all, combined with the subsequent need for domestic 
administrative implementation, there can be no such thing as a monopoly of information in the 
EU. And whereas it is true that certain aspects of the system, such as early discussions in the 
lower levels of COREPER, tend to take place in relative secret, the same might be said of the de 
facto preparation of legislation in national systems. Recent research seems to reveal that the EU 
regulatory processes are as open to input from civil society, and as constrained by the need to 
give reasons, as the (relatively open) systems of Switzerland and the U.S. Discussions within the 
comitologie appear to take due account of public interest considerations, though the precise rea-
sons for this—socialization, insulated expert discussion, external pressure of member states, 
structured deliberation, anticipated non-compliance—remain unclear (Joerges and Vos 1999; 
Majone 1998). 
 
The Legitimacy of Semi-Autonomous Judges and Technocrats  
 
It might be objected that the EU relies overly on autonomous technocrats in the Commis-
sion or constitutional court judges to resolve essentially political questions involving the appor-
tionment of costs, benefits and risks. Yet there is little that is distinctively “European” about the 
pattern of delegation we observe in the EU. The late twentieth century has been a period of the 
“decline of parliaments” and the rise of courts, public administrations, and the “core executive.” 
Accountability is imposed increasingly not through direct participation in majoritarian decision-
making but instead on complex systems of indirect representation, selection of representatives, 
professional socialization, ex post review, and balances between branches of government 
(Majone 1996). 
 
The critical point for the study of the EU is this: Within the multi-level governance system 
prevailing in Europe, EU officials (or insulated national representatives) enjoy the greatest 
autonomy in precisely those areas—central banking, constitutional adjudication, criminal and 
civil prosecution, technical administration, and economic diplomacy—in which many advanced 
industrial democracies, including most member states of the EU, insulate from direct political 
contestation. The apparently “undemocratic” nature of the EU as a whole is largely a function 
of this selection effect.  
 
Insulation is not simply an empirical observation; it has normative weight. To understand 
why requires that we address justifications for the apparently “counter-majoritarian” tendency of 
political institutions that are insulated from direct democratic contestation. Most such insulated  
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institutions arise out of the logic of commitment; that is, as an effort to enforce or embed the im-
partial implementation of prior bargains. Three justifications, often combined, are most common.  
 
First is the need for greater attention, efficiency and expertise in areas where most citi-
zens remain “rationally ignorant” or non-participatory. Universal involvement in government 
policy would impose costs beyond the willingness of any modern citizen to bear. Insulated insti-
tutions reduce decision-making costs by encouraging specialization. They thus permit efficient 
and consistent decisions to occur in areas of weak or intermittent citizen involvement and inter-
est, most importantly where scientific, legal or administrative expertise is expensive to acquire 
yet expert, informed decision-making is desired. As such expertise has come to play a greater 
role in policy-making, delegation to specialized authorities in areas from environmental policy to 
food and drug authorization has become more common. 
 
Second is the need to promote justice, equality and rights for individuals and minority 
groups. It is common to delegate to insulated authorities, such as constitutional courts, responsi-
bility for the enforcement of individual or minority prerogatives against the immediate “tyranny 
of the majority.” Such delegation is often justified where citizens seek to reduce the risk of con-
tracting into an uncertain future. This tendency has spread in recent years as increasing numbers 
of governmental functions have been recognized as basic or human rights that are judicially or 
administratively enforced, often at the international level, against political authorities.  
 
Third is the need to provide majorities with unbiased representation. Insulated institu-
tions offer one means to redress underlying biases in national democratic representation. The 
most common distortion is the capture of open political processes, and thus government policy, 
by powerful particularistic minorities with intense and immediate interests, who oppose the inter-
ests of majorities (often treated as “the median voter”) with diffuse, longer-term or less self-
conscious concerns. The classic understanding of trade policy, for example, sees the broadly 
liberal interests of consumers and firms trumped by pressure from powerful, self-conscious 
sectorally-organized protectionists. The EU may be more “representative” precisely because it is, 
in a narrow sense, less “democratic”. 
 
Given these justifications, the burden of proof rests on critics of the EU. We may debate 
whether the EU’s central bank, constitutional court, or competition authorities are properly con-
structed, but any such criticism must first concede the legitimacy and general acceptability of a 
greater measure of insulation and autonomy in precisely these areas than elsewhere in political 
life. 
 
 
DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION: WHY THE EU CANNOT EXPAND PARTICIPATION 
 
Radical democrats might nonetheless be tempted to reject the entire trend toward insu-
lated decision-making, domestic and international, because the cost in terms of political partici-
pation is too high. Such critics might observe that the European Constitutional Settlement has 
failed to promote the transnational political parties, identities, and discourses that might help ren-
der European political participation meaningful and effective for citizens. A number of analysts 
propose to employ European institutions to induce social cooperation in pursuit of common in-
terests—political parties, interest groups, a common discourse, and so on. This in turn, they ex-
pect, will generate legitimacy. 
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Unless entirely grounded in an ideal preference for participation, however, these criti-
cisms rest on the questionable premise that greater participation in European political institutions 
will generate a deeper sense of political community in Europe or, at the very least, greater popu-
lar support for the EU. Yet there are at least three reasons to doubt that this is the case. 
 
First, insulated institutions—constitutional courts and administrative bureaucracies, for 
example—are often more popular with the public than legislatures. Internationally, institutions 
like the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg command great legitimacy de-
spite their near total lack of direct democratic legitimacy. The EU’s position in the institutional 
division of labor involves such political functions, as we have just seen, and it is unclear whether 
more participation in such functions would legitimate them. Whereas a greater sense of common 
identity might indeed increase support for the EU, this does not bear on the case for democratic 
reform but on the question of how extensive European integration should be. (Gibson 2000) 
 
Second, EU legislative and regulatory activity is inversely correlated with the salience of 
issues in the minds of European voters, so any effort to expand participation is unlikely to over-
come apathy. Among the most significant consequences of the limitation of the substantive scope 
of the EU, discussed above, is that the issues handled by the EU, and even more so second-order 
institutional choices about how to manage them, lack salience in the minds of European voters. 
Of the five most salient issues in most West European democracies—health care provision, edu-
cation, law and order, pension and social security policy, and taxation—none is primarily an EU 
competence. Among the next ten, only a few (managing the economy, the environment, along-
side the anomalous issue of Europe itself) could be considered major EU concerns, none exclu-
sively so.
4 By contrast, the issues in which the EU specializes—trade liberalization, monetary 
policy, the removal of non-tariff barriers, technical regulation in the environmental and other 
areas, foreign aid, and general foreign policy coordination—which tend to be low-salience issues 
in most European polities.  
 
Lack of salience, not lack of opportunity, may be the critical constraint on European po-
litical participation. This would explain why European citizens fail to exploit even the limited 
opportunities they have to participate. It follows that referenda, parliamentary elections, or con-
stitutional conventions based on such issues encourage informationally impoverished and institu-
tionally unstructured deliberation, which in turn encourages unstable plebiscitary politics in 
which individuals have no incentive to reconcile their concrete interests with their immediate 
choices. The typical result is a debacle like the recent Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty. Not 
only does this demonstrate the existence of significant substantive constraints on EU policy-
making, but it implies—as we shall see below—that even if a common European “identity” and 
the full panoply of democratic procedures existed, it would be very difficult to induce meaning-
ful citizen participation.  
 
Of course this could change in the future. But the proposals to construct greater citizen 
involvement in EU politics that are most plausible in theory are patently implausible in practice. 
In order to give individuals a reason to care about EU politics, it is necessary to give them a stake 
in it—a fact that many discussions of a demos, “we-feeling,” “community,” and “constitutional 
patriotism” elide.
5 The most compelling schemes for doing so rest not on the creation of new po-
                                                 
4 I am indebted to Bonnie Meguid for access to her systematic data on issue salience in European countries. 
5 For an exception, see Weiler 1998.  
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litical opportunities, but the emergence of entirely new political cleavages based on interest. Phi-
lippe Schmitter argues that agricultural supports and structural funds should be replaced with a 
guaranteed minimum income for the poorest one-third of Europeans, national welfare systems 
should be rebalanced so as not to favor the elderly, and immigrants and aliens should be granted 
full rights. (Schmitter 2000) With the EU acting as a massive engine of redistribution, individu-
als and groups would reorient their political behavior on whether they benefit or lose from the 
system. This is a coherent scheme targeted at precisely those groups most dissatisfied with Euro-
pean integration today—broadly speaking, the poorer, less well-educated, female, and public 
sector populations—but it is utterly impractical. In search of legitimacy, Schmitter breaks with 
the European Constitutional Settlement, divorcing the EU entirely from its ostensible purpose of 
regulating cross-border social behavior, but would thereby undermine the legitimacy of almost 
everyone currently involved with it. The result would almost certainly be a higher level of politi-
cal conflict, domestic and interstate, than Europe has seen in several generations. 
 
 
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: WHY EU GOVERNANCE IS NOT SUBSTANTIVELY BIASED 
 
Some argue that the EU lacks democratic legitimacy not so much because it stifles politi-
cal participation, but because its policies are biased against particular interests that are consen-
sually recognized as legitimate. Such accounts tend to be social democratic, that is, they tend to 
argue that the EU systematically biases policy-making in a neo-liberal direction.
6 It does this, so 
the argument goes, by excluding particular issues, in particular social welfare and some public 
interest regulation, from the agenda, while facilitating common liberalization of trade and factor 
flows. The entire arrangement is locked in by the European legal order. Opposition does not 
form because it is kept off the agenda by the European constitutional compromise, which leaves 
social welfare provision to the national governments, and by the ignorance of less fortunate indi-
viduals and groups about their own interests.  
 
Fritz Scharpf offers just such a critique.
7 Following Karl Polanyi and other social demo-
cratic theorists, Scharpf argues that the most important element in a democratic polity is to main-
tain the balance between market liberalization and social protection. Most Europeans favor main-
taining current levels of welfare spending, as demonstrated by the decentralized tendency of 
member states to spend increasing percentages of GNP on welfare as per capita income in-
creases. Yet the status quo cannot be maintained today because of the tendency of decentralized 
market competition to generate an interstate “race to the bottom” in regulatory protection. Trade, 
immigration and especially foreign investment and capital flows create strong incentives for 
countries to reduce welfare expenditures. The EU cannot respond effectively to this tendency, 
despite overwhelming support for the maintenance of welfare systems, because of a neo-liberal 
bias in the constitutional structure of the EU, and the rhetoric that surrounds it, which favors 
market liberalization (“negative integration”) over social protection (“positive integration”). This 
argument is outlined elsewhere in this volume, so I need not explain it further.  
 
Scharpf’s argument is without a doubt the most empirically and theoretically nuanced cri-
ticism of the EU “democratic deficit” that currently exists. Yet there is good reason to qualify his 
                                                 
6 Yet they need not be so. Many libertarians believe that policy in the EU, as well as in Europe as a whole, is biased in a social 
democratic direction. For example, see Rabkin 1998.  
7 Scharpf 1999. For a more detailed discussion of Scharpf, from both positive and normative perspectives, see Moravcsik and 
Sangiovanni, 2002.  
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formulation of the argument, above all since these qualifications are acknowledged in Scharpf’s 
own empirical analysis.  
 
There is little evidence of a race to the bottom. Scharpf himself concludes ultimately that 
there can be such a race in only a few areas, there is relatively little evidence that it has yet oc-
curred, and the effects have been limited. The level of social welfare provision in Europe re-
mains relatively stable. National welfare systems are no longer moving strongly in the direction 
of greater redistribution, but they are not imploding either. Recent OECD analyses report that fis-
cal consolidation over the past twenty years has almost always led to increases in government 
revenues as a percentage of GNP, and in most cases the burden of consolidation is placed pri-
marily on revenue increases. Much recent research, moreover, suggests that the adverse impact 
of globalisation on standards on the major areas of social spending in Europe (pensions, medical 
care, and labor market policy) is easily exaggerated. The most important factors behind increas-
ing social spending are instead domestic: the shift to a post-industrial economy, lower produc-
tivity growth, shifting demand for less skilled workers, rising costs health care, pensions and 
employment, exacerbated by increasingly unfavourable demographic trends. These factors fuel 
welfare deficits and fiscal strains, yet any reform is opposed by entrenched constituencies (the 
elderly, medical care consumers, and the full-time unemployed) well-placed to resist it. No re-
sponsible analyst believes that current individual social welfare entitlements can be maintained 
in the face of these structural shifts. In this context, the neo-liberal bias of the EU, if it exists, is 
justified by the social welfarist bias of current national policies. 
 
Nor is there much evidence that the EU is driving social protection downward. By con-
trast, the EU has often permitted high standards and supportive institutional reform, and thus has 
tended to reregulate at a high level (Vogel 1995; Joerges and Vos 2000). Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the EU is responsive to public and interest group concerns in a way quite similar to 
national polities.
8 For reasons set forth in Scharpf’s paper in this volume, there is far less reason 
for a social democrat to fear the piecemeal evolution of European law than might have been the 
case five years ago (Also Scharpf 1999). Whatever consequences there may be lie largely in the 
future. The major difference between apparently intractable issues of EU discussion such as so-
cial and tax harmonization, and similar issues where European regulation is effective, such as 
worker health and safety, appears not to lie in constitutional structure but in the precise nature of 
conflicts of interest among national governments. In the case of taxation, some governments re-
main deeply opposed to the harmonization of taxation and social welfare, whereas there are few 
die-hard defenders of unilateralism in matters of worker health and safety or pollution abatement. 
In this sense, the EU reflects patterns of consensus and contestation within European publics. 
 
From the perspective of democratic theory, finally, it is important to note that Scharpf’s 
proposals are concerned primarily to maintain social protection in richer member states. They are 
quite conservative in that they favor domestic redistribution over transnational redistribution; the 
defense of German welfare standards takes precedence over schemes for transnational redistribu-
tion. Scharpf’s justification lies in the subjective perceptions of identity of national citizens in 
countries like Germany, which do not support a heavy commitment to redistribution. Yet this is 
likely to be perceived very differently in poorer member states, and thus in particular among the 
                                                 
8 The life-cycle of an issue like Mad Cow disease is just as it would be in any Western democracy: Some bureaucracies are 
captured; a crisis emerges; and reforms are put in place that lay greater emphasis on the broader public interest. Joerges and Vos 
1999.  
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new members of Central and Eastern Europe. This leads us to the most significant challenge fac-
ing the EU over the next decade: enlargement. 
 
 
THE CHALLENGE OF ENLARGEMENT: WHY THE EU IS LIKELY TO REMAIN LEGITIMATE 
 
Will enlargement alter the generally optimistic prospect for democratic legitimacy in the 
EU? Given that expansion of such intensive international cooperation to include such a varied 
group of countries is unprecedented, any assessment must remain more speculative than scien-
tific. Yet there is nonetheless good reason to be hopeful. 
 
The analysis above suggests that the most fundamental source of the EU’s legitimacy lies 
in the democratic accountability of national governments. These is little reason to doubt that, on 
balance, the prospect of enlargement and the practice of membership in the EU bolsters domestic 
democratic institutions in applicant countries. The “power of attraction” is perhaps the most 
powerful instrument of democratization that European governments possess, and indeed perhaps, 
next to trade policy, their most powerful foreign policy instrument overall. There is compelling 
evidence that the prospect of enlargement has significantly strengthened centrist democratic par-
ties in Central and East European countries (Vachudova 2001) As long as the domestic govern-
ments of these countries remain liberal democracies, there is no reason to doubt that their inter-
actions with the EU will remain as firmly subject to democratic accountability as national poli-
cies. To be sure, the EU runs the risk of admitting countries that could subsequently vote in anti-
democratic parties. The recent debacle of EU pressure on Austria, which is widely perceived as 
having been counterproductive, has demonstrated the difficulty (if not futility) of EU efforts to 
micromanage the domestic democratic practices of member states. Still, a wholesale challenge to 
democracy, as opposed to an ideologically unattractive right-wing minority party, might generate 
a more credibly effective response. This is certainly the lesson many took from the Spanish ex-
perience. In this sense, EU enlargement is almost certain to promote democracy in the region. 
 
A more significant threat stems from the greater diversity and heterogeneity of interests 
within an EU of twenty to twenty-five (Moravcsik 1998, Nello and Smith 1997). The most com-
mon argument about this diversity is, however, not the most convincing. One often hears that the 
EU will become gridlocked as a result of the increase in the number of EU member states. This 
folk wisdom is based on the rather primitive notion that the probability of gridlock is an ex-
ponential function number of potential national vetoes, which is itself a direct function of the 
number of members. Certainly the conclusion has a certain Cartesian clarity, but is it correct? 
Whereas individual vetoes may be impose a binding constraint in a limited number of cases of 
unanimity voting, as with the role of Greece in foreign policy or Luxembourg in banking, this is 
little reason to believe that this is generally the essential concern. Most issues involve compro-
mises between opposing coalitions, whereby the total number of countries matters less. In any 
case, there are relatively few remaining issues where cooperation is promising but unanimity is 
the norm. It is perhaps more likely that greater heterogeneity of interests would undermine the 
cohesion of parties within the EP, making effective legislation more difficult. Yet the most recent 
analyses suggest that as long as countries have similar parties, cohesion is not narrowly depend-
ent on the precise range of ideological difference (Hix et al 2002). 
 
  Decisive is the question whether conflicts of interest, particularly those involving the redis-
tribution of resources, will place undue strain on EU governance. The critical issue is likely to  
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focus on EU budgetary transfers and whose interests they represent. Nearly every country that 
has entered the EU—most notably Britain, Greece, and Spain—received a relatively unfavorable 
financial settlement, to which the response of each has been to obstruct EU legislation until they 
received a financial side payment. EU regional policy was a response to the British referendum 
of 1975. In the 1980s, structural funding was established and expanded as the result of pressure 
from Mediterranean country. Financial transfers contributed to the legitimacy of the EU in a 
number of countries. This will be far more difficult a strategy for future entrants to pursue, due to 
the larger number of core members, the larger size of the acquis, the lack of major issues on the 
horizon, and the recent introduction of flexibility provisions that might well permit rich countries 
to react to such a situation by opting out and moving together as a subgroup. Structural and 
agricultural funding is unlikely to be extended at the same level as in the past. (Nello and Smith 
1997, 28) Labor movement is likely to see some de facto transition period. This, in turn, may 
reduce the popularity, and thus the perceived democratic legitimacy, of the EU.
9 In this context, 
the current arrangement, in which small countries can block unanimity votes, may offer a better 
prospect of forcing continued redistribution than any type of decision-making reform. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When judged by the practices of existing nation-states and in the context of a multi-level 
system, there is little evidence that the EU suffers from a fundamental democratic deficit. This is 
not to say that there are no causes for concern. There are a few areas where the EU departs mod-
estly from existing national practices without a compelling substantive justification. The most 
important is the structure of European Central Bank, which is more independent of political pres-
sure than any known national example (Herdegen 1998). One need not draw analogies to the 
1930s to view overly independent central banks with reserve. Another is the rights of immi-
grants, where EU standards are evolving but could move in a direction more restrictive than the 
European norm. Still another area is administrative procedure, where the formal rights enjoyed 
by residents of the US under the Administrative Procedures Act surpass those formally guaran-
teed in Europe. Finally, Scharpf is correct to call attention to the possibility that in the future, 
European administrative and constitutional law might move in a direction inimical to social wel-
fare provision. Yet as of yet there is little evidence that these specific examples add up to a struc-
tural “democratic deficit” in the EU. Any mature polity could point to areas in which such demo-
cratic protections are stronger or weaker; in this regard the EU is hardly exceptional. 
 
So, we might reasonably ask, why, then, is there such public and scholarly concern about 
the “democratic deficit”? As I argued in the introduction, this criticism appears to result, above 
all, from a tendency to privilege the abstract over the concrete. Most critics compare the EU to 
an ideal plebiscitary or parliamentary democracy, standing alone, rather than to the actual func-
tioning of national democracies, and corrected for its multi-level context. When we conduct the 
latter sort of analysis, we see that EU decision-making procedures, including those that insulate 
or delegate certain decisions, are very much in line with the general practice of most modern de-
mocracies in carrying out similar functions. This overall trend toward insulation of certain func-
tions is in turn driven, most analysts believe, by considerations that should be given normative 
weight, such as the complexity of many policy issues, the rational ignorance and apathy of many 
                                                 
9 Whether this in fact does so depends, of course, on which standard we adopt. A rise in nationalism and a decline in European 
feeling is possible as well, though .the democratic status of this outcome is unclear. (Nello and Smith 1997, 47)  
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publics, the desire to protect minority rights, and the power of certain special interests in situa-
tions of open political contestation. These constraints cannot be assumed away; they must be 
acknowledged on their own terms. As long as political procedures are consistent with existing 
national democratic practice and have a prima facie normative justification, I conclude, we can-
not draw negative conclusions about the legitimacy of the EU from casual observation of the 
non-participatory nature of its institutions—a dictum that could usefully be applied in many con-
texts outside of the EU. 
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